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ABSTRACT

A perennial debate in corporate finance concerns the
question of optimal capital structure: given the level of
total capital necessary to support a company's activities,

is there a way of dividing up that capital into debt and
equity that maximizes current firm value? And, if so, what

are the critical factors in setting the leverage ratio for
a given company?
Corporate finance researchers have long been puzzled

by low corporate debt ratios given debt's corporate tax

advantage. What makes the capital structure debate
especially intriguing is that the different theories

represent such different, and in some ways almost
diametrically opposed, decision-making processes. For

instance, some researchers defend Miller and Modigliani by
arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy

are largely "irrelevant" in the sense that they have no
significant, predictable effects on corporate financing.
However, another school of thought holds that corporate
financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers

to balance the tax shields of greater debt against the

increased probability and costs of financial distress,
including those arising from corporate underinvestment.

But if too much debt can destroy value by causing

iii

financial distress and underinvestment, other schools of
thought have argued that too little debt, at least in

large, mature companies- can lead to overinvestment and
low returns on capital.
The purpose of this paper is to present a literature
survey about the Capital structure puzzle theories and
studies by different schools of thoughts over the past

half a century. My concern is to illustrate the findings

of capital structure studies and to present their
contributions to the corporate finance literature, and to

give my personal opinion about these results concluding by
my estimation of the optimal capital structure. Thus, I am
going to emphasize the role of corporate finance in
supporting an interior optimum capital structure.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
Financing policy of firms requires managers to
identify ways of finding new investment. The managers have
three main alternatives; use retained earnings, borrow
through debt instruments, or issue new equity shares.

Hence, the standard capital structure of a firm includes
equity (including retained earnings), and debt; these

components of capital structure reflect firm ownership
structure in the sense that the first component reflects

ownership by shareholders while the second component
represents ownership by debt holders. This pattern is

found in developing and developed countries alike.

Financing policy, capital structure and firm ownership are
all strongly linked in explaining how economic agents form

and modify their asset acquisition behavior through firms

and capital markets, and thereby influence their incomes
and returns to asset holdings, whether in the form of
direct remuneration, capital gains or dividends.

Corporate capital structure has been one of the most
popular issues in financial economics. Many theoretical

and empirical studies have been done to examine the
effects of corporate capital structure determinants

1

including taxes, profitability, firm size; type of assets,
volatility, and business risk on the firm's financing

decision. Two competing theories have been raised to
explain corporate capital structure: The trade-off
hypothesis and the pecking order theory.

In the trade-off hypothesis, firms choose their

optimal debt ratio by weighing the.benefits (tax of
interest payment) and costs (potential bankruptcy costs)

of debt financing. In this model, taxes are regarded as a
potentially important factor. Since interest payments can

be deducted in determining corporate taxable income, an

incentive exists for the firm to use debt financing even

if this incentive is reduced by the tax disadvantage of
personal income taxes paid by the recipient on the

interest payments.'
The trade-off hypothesis focuses on the tax advantage
of debt, thus, implying a positive relationship between a
firm's value and its debt ratio. Moreover, every firm has
its own optimal leverage target that maximizes its firm
value, and a firm's actual leverage is expected to revert

towards the target leverage.
In the pecking order theory, firms finance new
investments in a specific order: First, with retained
earnings, then with safe debt, then with risky debt, and

2

i finally with equity to
1

minimize asymmetric information

! costs. Compared to the trade-off hypothesis, the pecking

I order theory focuses on the profitability, implying a
I

' negative relationship between a firm's value and its debt

! ratio. Moreover, in this model, there is no optimal or
i

| target leverage.
Some writers argue that corporate managers making

;
I

financing decisions are concerned primarily with the

. "signaling" effects of such decisions-for example, the
I

I tendency of stock prices to fall significantly in response
I

j to common stock offerings (which can make such offerings

[ very expensive for existing shareholders) and to rise in

jresponse to leverage increasing recapitalizations.
I

■Building on this signaling argument, Stewart Myers has

I

j suggested that corporate capital structures are simply the

I cumulative result of individual financing decisions in

'which managers follow a financial pecking order-one in
which retained earnings are preferred to outside
financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside

funding is required.
According to Myers, corporate managers making
financing decisions are not really thinking about an

optimal capital structure that is, a long-run targeted
!debt-to-equity ratio they eventually want to achieve.
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Instead, they simply take the "path of least resistance"

and choose what then appears to be the low-cost financing
vehicle-generally debt-with little thought about the

future consequences of these choices.
The purpose of this study is to find the optimal

corporate capital structure for firms. What is the optimal
capital structure of a company? What factors make a

company prefer debt financing to equity financing?
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE

A firm consists of assets which produce a stream of

cash flows. The capital structure decision determines how
those assets will be paid for, and thus how the cash flows
will be allocated among different claims (debt, equity,

etc.).
The best way to think about an optimal firm structure
is that the current owners of a firm are thinking about
II

how to sell their firm today (Welch, 1996). Their goal is

i

I to design a corporate charter that maximizes the total
1I

|market-value of their firm today, that is the price that
i

lnew investors will be willing to pay to acquire the firm
ifrom the old investors. The corporate charter must not
I

I only specify the voting rules, the procedure to replace

j incumbent managers and how the charter can be changed in
'the future, but also how future earnings are to be split

among different owners (such as bondholders and

stockholders) and stakeholders (such as customers,
workers, and suppliers). The agreement how to split up

future earnings-either explicitly outlined or implicitly

allowed to be changed in the future-is the firm's
financial structure: rules that specify who receives the
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proceeds of (possibly uncertain) future cash-flows (Welch,

1996).
Historically, corporations have been using bonds and
stocks (equity). In general, bonds ("financial leverage")

are like loans, promising certain payoffs. Equity is like
ownership, receiving whatever is left over after the
promises to bondholders have been honored. In addition,

modern corporations can use a variety of financial
instruments that promise different future payoffs to
various buyers under various scenarios: convertible debt,

equity, warrants, derivatives, leases and trade credit.
Firms can also collateralize assets and/or borrow from
banks. Our discussion will focus mostly on the choice

between simple debt and equity, although the purpose of
this study is to provide the necessary intuition to

understand why other financial instruments can be useful.

Theory
The capital structure puzzle is intended to remind

analysts about the Dividend puzzle and Fischer Black's
well known saying: "What should the corporation do about

dividend policy? We don't know." Stewart C. Myers, in his

article entitled: "The Capital Structure Puzzle," started
his argument by asking: "How do firms choose their capital
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structure?" Again, the very usual answer is, "We don't
know."

Researchers and analysts know more about the dividend
policy puzzle than they do know about the capital

structure one. John Lintner's model of how firms set
dividends dates back to 1956, and it still seems to work

in Stewart C. Myers' opinion. We know that stock prices

are extremely sensitive to any unexpected dividend
changes; this makes clear that dividends have information

content; this information dates back at least to Miller

and Modigliani, 1961. Myers argues that we do not know
whether high dividend yield increases the expected return

required by investors, as adding taxes to the Miller and

Modigliani proof of dividend irrelevance suggests, but
financial analysts are at least investigating and

advancing at this concern.
We do not know that much about capital structure. We

do not know how firms choose the debt, equity or
securities they issue. There is not enough research and

proof testing whether the relationship between financial
leverage and the demanded return by investors is as the
wholesome Miller and Modigliani theory foretells.
Scholars and analysts have thought long and hard

about what these insights imply for optimal capital
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structure. Financial economists translated these theories

of optimal capital structure into more or less definite
advice to managers. However, their theories do not seem to

explain actual financing behavior, and it seems bigheaded
to advise firms on optimal capital structure when they are
still far from explaining actual decisions.

There are two different ways of thinking about
capital structure; the first is a static tradeoff
framework that sees the firm as setting a target

debt-to-total-assets ratio and gradually moving towards
it, the same way that a company adjusts dividends to move

towards a target payout ratio. The second way is an
old-fashioned pecking order framework, in which the firm
prefers a cheaper capital, and so it favors internal to

external financing and debt to equity if it issues
securities. In the unadulterated pecking order theory, the
firm has no well-defined target debt ratio.

The Static Tradeoff Hypothesis
A company's optimal debt ratio is always seen as
determined by a tradeoff of the costs and benefits of
borrowing, holding the firm's assets and investment plans
constant. The firm is portrayed as balancing the value of

interest tax shields against various costs of bankruptcy
or financial embarrassment. Of course, there is a
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controversy about how valuable the tax shields are, and
which, if any, of the costs of financial embarrassment are

material. But these disagreements give only variations on

a theme. The firm is supposed to substitute debt for
equity, and equity for debt, until the value of the firm

is maximized (Myers, 1984).
Costs of adjustment: if there were no costs of

adjustment, and the static tradeoff theory was correct,

then each firm's observed debt ratio should be its optimal
ratio. On the other hand, there are costs and consequently
lags, in adjusting to the optimum. Firms cannot instantly

offset the unsystematic events that smack them away from

the optimum, so there should be some cross-sectional
spreading of actual debt ratio across a model of firms

having the same target ratio (Myers, 1984) .

Huge adjustment costs could possibly explain the
observed broad variation in actual debt ratios, since
firms would be forced into long expeditions away from

their optimal ratios. Although there is nothing in the
typical static tradeoff stories suggesting that

modification costs are a first order concern-in fact, they

are rarely brought up. According to Myers, "Invoking them
without modeling them is a cop-out."
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Any cross-sectional test of financing behavior should
specify whether firms' debt ratios diverge because they

have different optimal ratios or because their actual
ratios deviate from optimal ones. It is easy to mix up the

two cases. For example, Myers mentioned in his article,
"The Capital Structure Puzzle" about the early
cross-sectional studies which attempted to test Miller and

Modigliani's proposition. These studies tried to find out

if differences in leverage affected the market value of
the firm or the market capitalization rate of its

operating income. With observation, Myers affirmed we can
quickly see the problem: if adjustment costs are small,

and each firm in the sample is at its optimum or close to

it, then the in sample dispersion of debt ratios must
reflect differences in risk or in other variables

affecting optimal capital structure. But then Miller and
Modigliani's proposition I cannot be tested unless the

effects of risk and other variables on firm value can be
adjusted for. This shows how inflexible and tough it is to

hold "other things constant" in cross-sectional
regressions.

The easy way to make sense to these tests is to

assume that adjustment costs are small, but managers do

not know or care what the optimal debt ratio is, and thus
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do not stay close to it. On the other hand, if we do not
take such an assumption, then if adjustment costs are

small, and firms stay near their target debt ratios, it
will be tough to understand the observed diversity of
capital structures across firms that seem similar in a

static tradeoff framework. If adjustment costs are so

large, that some firms take extended excursions away from
their targets, then we ought to give less attention to

refining our static tradeoff anecdotes and relatively more
attention to understanding what the adjustment costs are,

why they are so important, and how rational managers would
respond to them.
The Pecking Order Theory

This theory is opposite to the former one with a

competing popular story based on a financing pecking
order, it assumes that:
1.

Firms prefer internal finance

2.

They adapt their target dividend payout ratios

to their investment opportunities, although

dividends are sticky and target payout ratios
are only gradually adjusted to shifts in the

extent of valuable investment opportunities.
3.

Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable

fluctuations in profitability and investment
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opportunities, mean that internally-generated
cash flow may be more or less than investment

outlays. If it is less, the firm first draws
down its cash balance or marketable securities

portfolio. If it is more, the firm first pays
off debt or invests in cash or marketable
securities. If the surplus persists, it may

gradually increase its target payout ratio.
4.

If external finance is required, firms issue the
safest security first, that is, they start with

debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as

convertible bonds, then maybe equity as a last

resort. In this story, there is no well-defined
target debt-equity mix, because there are two
kinds of equity, internal and external, one at
the top of the pecking order and one at the

bottom. Each firm's observed debt ratio reflects
its cumulative requirements for external

finance.
According to Donald H. Chew, Jr. in his book
"Corporate Finance, Where Theory Meets Practice", the

pecking order signaling theory says that financing
decisions are based at least in part, on management's

perception on the "fairness" of the market's current
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valuation of the stock. Declared as simply as possible,

the theory suggests that, in order to minimize the
information costs of issuing securities, a company is more

likely to issue debt than equity if the firm appears
undervalued, and to issue stock rather.than debt if the

firm seems overvalued.
The pecking order theory takes this argument one step

farther, suggesting that the information costs associated

with issuing securities are so large that they dominate
all other considerations. According to this theory,

companies maximize value by systematically choosing to
finance new investments with the cheapest available source

of funds. Specifically, the companies prefer internally
generated funds being typically the retained earnings, to

external funding. If outside funds are necessary, the
companies prefer debt to equity because of the lower

information costs associated with debt issues. Chew
confirms as Myers did that companies issue equity only as
a last resort, when their debt capacity has been
exhausted.
The pecking order theory would thus suggest that

companies with few investment opportunities and

substantial free cash flow will have low debt ratios- and

that high-growth firms with lower operating cash flows
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will have higher debt ratios. In this sense, the theory
suggests not only that interest tax shields and the costs

of financial distress are at most a second-order concern
but also that the logic of the pecking order actually

leads to a set of predictions that are precisely the

opposite of those offered by the tax and contracting cost
arguments presented earlier.

The preference of public corporations for internal
financing and the relative infrequency of stock issues by

established firms have long been attributed to the

separation of ownership and control and the desire of

managers to avoid the discipline of capital markets.
According to Myers (1984), managers who maximize market

value will avoid external equity financing if they have

better information than outside investors are rational.
The pecking order theory explains why the bulk of

external financing comes from debt. It also explains why
more profitable firms borrow less: not because their
target debt ratio is low- in the pecking order they don't

have a target- but because profitable firms have more
internal financing available. Less profitable firms

require external financing, and consequently accumulate
debt.
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Of course, the pecking order theory can be quickly

rejected if we require it to explain everything. Myers
authenticates that there are plenty of examples of firms

issuing stock when they could issue investment-grade debt.

But if we consider aggregates, we find that the heavy
reliance on internal finance and debt is clear. For all

non-financial corporations over the decade 1973-1982
(Myers, 1984), internally generated cash covered on
average 62 percent of capital expenditures, including
investment in inventory and other current assets. The bulk

of demanded external financing comes from borrowing.

Stewart C. Myers confirms that writers on "managerial
capitalism" have interpreted firms' reliance on internal
finance as a by-product of the separation of ownership and

control: professional managers avoid relying on external
finance because it would subject them to the discipline of

the capital market. Donaldson's 1969 book was not
primarily about marginal capitalism, but it nevertheless

states that the financing decisions of the firms he
studied were not directed towards maximizing shareholder

wealth, and that scholars attempting to explain those
decisions would have to start by recognizing the

managerial view of corporate finance (Myers, 1984). This
conclusion is natural given the state of finance theory in
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the 1960s. Today, it is not so obvious that financing by a
pecking order goes against shareholders' interests.
An argument can always be made for internal financing

to avoid issue costs, and if external finance is needed

for debt to avoid the still higher costs of equity. But
issue costs in themselves are not big enough to override

the costs and benefits of leverage emphasized in the
static tradeoff story.
Discussion of the Theory
and its Evidence

In investigating corporate finance behavior and how
that behavior affects security returns, Myers (1984)
presented two approaches to understanding capital

structure that are evaluated with respect to 5 aspects of
financing behavior: 1) internal versus external financing,

2) timing of security issues, 3) borrowing against
intangibles and growth opportunities, 4) exchange offers
and 5) issue or repurchase of shares. A static trade-off

framework is presented in which the firm is viewed as
setting a target debt ratio and gradually moving toward

it, in much the same way that a firm adjusts dividends to
move toward a target payout ratio. In contrast, a pecking
order approach in which the firm prefers internal to
external financing and debt to equity if it issues
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securities is developed. In the pure pecking model, the
firm has no well-defined target debt ratio. A modified
pecking order strategy, incorporating those elements of
the static trade-off model which have clear empirical
support, provides a better approach to understanding

corporate financing behavior.

The way I am going to start discussing this theory of
"Capital Structure Puzzle" and its evidence is by listing

what we know about financing behavior and by trying to
make sense of this knowledge in terms of the two
hypotheses stated earlier. My discussion and analysis will

be based on financial economists and researchers'

findings. I will start by stating some facts about
financing behavior, before generalizing them.

Internal versus External Equity

Combined investment expenditures are predominately
financed by debt issues and internally-generated funds.

New stock issues play a relatively small part. This
reality is what the pecking order hypothesis suggested in

the first place (Myers, 1984). But it might also be
explained in a static tradeoff theory by adding
significant transaction costs of equity issues and noting

the favorable tax treatment of capital gains relative to
dividends. This would make external equity relatively
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expensive. It would explain why companies keep target
dividend payouts low enough to avoid having to make
regular stock issues. It would also explain why a firm

whose debt ratio climbs above target does not immediately

issue stock, buy back debt, and re-establish a more
moderate debt ratio. Thus, firms might take extended

excursions above their debt targets. However, the

out-of-pocket costs of repurchasing shares seem fairly
small. It is thus hard to explain extended excursions
below a firms' debt target by an added static tradeoff
theory. The firm could quickly issue debt and buy back

shares. Moreover, if personal income taxes are important
in explaining firm's apparent preferences of internal
equity, then it's difficult to explain why external equity

is not strongly negative that is why- according to Myers why most firms haven't gradually move to materially lower
target payout ratios and used the released cash to
repurchase shares.

Timing of Security Issues
Firms apparently try to time stock issues when

security prices are high. Given that they seek external
finance, they are more likely to issue stock rather than

debt after stock processes have risen than after they have

fallen. This fact is embarrassing to static tradeoff
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advocates. If firm value rises, the debt ratio falls, and
firms ought to issue debt, not equity, to rebalance their

capital structures.
The fact is equally embarrassing to the pecking order

hypothesis. There is no reason to believe that the

manager's inside information is systematically more
favorable when stock prices are high. Even if there were

such a tendency, investors would have learned it by now,
and would interpret the firm's issue decision accordingly.
Myers confirmed "There is no way firms can systematically
take advantage of purchasers

of

new equity in rational

expectations equilibrium."

Borrowing against Intangibles and Growth
Opportunities
Firms holding valuable intangible assets or growth

opportunities tend to borrow less than firms holding
mostly tangible assets. Myers stated that there is plenty

of indirect evidence indicating that the level of
borrowing is determined not just by the value and risk of

the firm's assets, but also by the type of assets it
holds. Without this distinction, the static tradeoff

theory would specify all target debt ratios in terms of
market, not book values. Since many firms have market

values far in excess of book values- even if these book
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values are restated in current dollars- we ought to see at
least a few such firms operating comfortably at very high

book debt ratios (Myers, 1984). The fact begins to make

sense as soon as we realize that book values reflect

assets-in-place, meaning tangible assets and working

capital. Market values reflect intangibles and growth

opportunities as well as assets-in-place. Thus, firms do
not set target book debt ratios because accountants
certify the books. Book asset values are proxies for the
values of assets in place.
Exchange Offers

The offers happen when a firm offers to exchange debt
for equity or equity for debt. Masulis has shown that

stock prices rise on average when a firm offers to
exchange debt for equity and fall' when they offer to
exchange equity for debt (Masulis, 1980). Myers explained
this fact by various ways. For example, it might be a tax

effect. If most firms' debt ratios are below their optimal
ratios and if corporate interest tax shields have

significant positive value, the debt for equity exchanges
would tend to move firms closer to optimum capital

structure. Equity-for-debt swaps would tend to move them
farther away.
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The evidence on exchanges hardly builds confidence in

the static tradeoff theory as a description of financing

behavior. If the theory were right, firms would be
sometimes above and sometimes below their optimum ratios.
Those above would offer to exchange equity for debt. Those

below would offer debt for equity. In both cases, the firm

would move closer to the optimum. Myers asked "Why should

an exchange offer be good news if in one direction and bad
news if in the other?"
As Masulis pointed out, the firm's willingness to

exchange debt for equity might signal that the firm's debt
capacity had, in the management's opinion, increased. That

is, it would signal an increase in firm value or a

reduction in firm risk. As a result of the fact, a
debt-for-equity exchange would be good news, and the

opposite exchange bad news.

The idea that an exchange offer reveals a change in
the firm's target debt ratio, and thereby signals changes

in firm value or risk, sounds plausible. But an equally

plausible story can be told without saying anything about
a target debt ratio. If the manager with superior

information acts to maximize the intrinsic value of
existing shares, then the announcement of a stock issue

should be bad news, other things equal, because stock
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issues will be more likely when the manager receives bad
news. On the other hand, stock retirements should be good
news. Myers points out that the news in both cases has no
evident necessary connection with shifts in target debt

ratios.

It may be possible, according to Myers, to build a
model combining asymmetric information with the costs and
benefits of borrowing emphasized in static tradeoff

stories. However, it will prove difficult to do this

without also introducing some elements of the pecking
order theory.

Issue or Repurchase of Shares
This fact is obviously not a surprise given the
previous one. On average, stock price falls when firms

announce a stock issue. Stock prices rise, on average,

when a stock repurchase is announced. This fact has been

confirmed in several studies including Vermaelen (1981) .
This fact is hard to explain by a static tradeoff
model, except as an information effect in which stock

issues or retirements signal changes in the firm's target
debt ratio.

The simple asymmetric information model Myers used to
motivate the pecking order hypothesis does predict that

the announcement of a stock issue will cause stock price
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to fall. It also predicts that stock price should, not

fall, other things equal, if default-risk debt is issued.
Of course, a private company can issue debt that is
absolutely protected from default, but it seems reasonable

to predict that the average stock price impact of

high-grade debt issues will he small relative to the
average impact of stock issues (Dann & Mikkleson, 1983).

All these results pointed out in theory and
researches by analysts and writers make us more
comfortable with asymmetric information models of the kind
sketched above, and thus a bit more comfortable with the

pecking order story. Indeed, Myers points out that people

feel comfortable with the static tradeoff story because it
sounds plausible and yields an interior optimum debt

ratio. It rationalizes moderate borrowing. Myers adds that
the story may be moderate and plausible, but that does not

make it right. We have to ask whether it explains firm's
financing behavior. If eventually, it does not, then we

need a better theory before offering advice to managers.

In what follows, I will present a model of optimal
capital structure presented by Michael Bradley, Gregg A.

Jarrell and E. Han Kim in their article entitled "On the
Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and

Evidence." The model synthesizes the current state of the
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art in the theory of optimal capital structure. It
captures the essence of the
tax-advantage-and-bankruptcy-costs trade off models of
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), Kim (1978),

and Titman (1984), the agency costs of debt arguments of
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Myers (1977) .
To develop a model that represents the current state

of the art in the theory of optimal capital structure,
Bradley, Gregg, and Kim (1983) made the following

assumptions:
a.

Investors are risk-neutral.

b.

Investors face a progressive tax rate on returns
from bonds, while the firm faces a constant

statutory marginal tax rate.

c.

Corporate and personal taxes are based on
end-of-period wealth; consequently, debt

payments (interest and principle) are fully
deductible in calculating the firm's
end-of-period tax bill, and are fully taxable at

the level of the individual bondholder.
d.

Equity returns (equity and capital gains) are
taxed at a constant rate.

e.

There exist non-debt tax shields, such as
accelerated depreciation and investment tax
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credits, that reduce the firm's end-of-period

tax liability.

f.

Negative tax bills (unused tax credits) are not

transferable (saleable) either through time or
across firms.

g.

The firm will incur various costs associated

with financial distress should it fail to meet
in full the end-of-period payment promised to

its bondholders.
h.

The firm's end-of-period value before taxes and

debt payments is a random variable. If the firm

fails to meet the debt obligation to its
bondholders, the costs associated with financial

distress will reduce the value of the firm by a
constant fraction.

The first assumption, that of risk neutrality,
eliminates the need to model the general equilibrium issue

of the trade-off between the tax status and the
risk/expected return characteristic of debt and equity

securities. In this context, risk-neutrality is equivalent
to assuming that investors form either all-equity or
all-debt portfolios depending on their tax rates.
Assumptions (b) through (d) describe the tax
environment of the model. Assumption (d) relaxes the
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undesirable assumption of a zero tax rate on income from

stocks that has been commonly used by authors.
Assumptions (e) and (f) are made to incorporate the

effects of non-debt tax shields on the corporate leverage

decision. Assumption (f) prohibits firms from carrying tax
credits backward or forward, or from selling them via a
leasing agreement or through a merger.

Finally, assumptions (g) and (h) allow for the
existence of costs associated with risky debt that are

incurred when the firm encounters difficulty in meeting
its end-of-period obligation to its debt holders.

To show that the net tax advantage of debt is

positive with a constant-positive tax rate on equity
returns, the analysts considered both the demand and
supply of corporate debt and equity. In a risk neutral
world, affirmed the writers of the model, investors are

indifferent between holding stocks and bonds as long as

the expected after-tax returns are the same. On the
corporate side, firms are indifferent between issuing
stocks and bonds as long as the marginal expected
after-tax cost of issuing debt is the same as the marginal
expected cost of issuing equity.
The comparative static and the simulation of the

model provide some testable implications. The debt ratio
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is inversely related to the costs of financial distress,
which include bankruptcy costs.

This model synthesizes the modern balancing theory of

optimal capital structure. It incorporates positive

personal taxes on equity and on bond income, expected
costs of financial distress (bankruptcy costs and agency

costs), and positive non-debt tax shields. It shows that
optimal firm leverage is related inversely to expected

costs of financial distress and to the amount of non-debt

tax shields. A simulation analysis demonstrates that if

costs of financial distress are significant, optimal firm
leverage is related inversely to the variability of firm
earnings.

The Use of Debt in the
Capital Structure
Before boarding into the usefulness of the bringing
into play of debt in the capital structure and its worth

to the firm, we have to define the management's first
place goal: is it the maximization of the value of equity

or the value of the firm?

A good starting point for our analysis is the common
misunderstanding that in order to optimize the firm's

capital structure; managers should maximize the value of

equity. For this sake, I used Ivo Welch's analysis and
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thoughts in examining this matter as expressed in his

article "A Primer on Capital Structure"

(1996) . Even

though equity is a part of the firm's capital structure,

there is also debt and many financial instruments with

both debt and equity features that managers should take
into account. Welch states in his "A Primer on Capital
Structure" article (1996) that if an alternative capital

structure would lead to a higher value for the overall

firm (the sum of the values of all securities), the latter

would be a better capital structure.
To see the difference, Welch assumes there was a way

(known by everybody) in which managers could increase the
value of equity by $1 if they could reduce the value of
debt by $3 . This would reduce the value of the firm by $2.
Managers are now faced with a dilemma: should they

maximize the firm value, or should they maximize the value
of equity, which after all votes managers into office and
allows them to stay in office? Thus, managers may find it

in their interest to do this exchange-even though this
lowers the value of the firm (i.e., the total value of all
assets and projects, both current and future, which equals

the total value of all financing instruments). Yet, note
that today's (ex-ante) purchasers of debt will take into
consideration the possible future (ex-post) loss in the
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value of their debt, and will rationally demand

compensation (an extra $3 discount) for the possibility of
this transfer. If managers cannot commit not to undertake

the 3-for-l exchange, everyone will realize that ex-post
managers will like to do this when the time comes.

Therefore, managers today would either reduce the value of

the firm (equity) by $2, or have to forego issuing debt
(as we will see later, debt in the capital structure could
have valuable tax benefits). Even if the firm does not

need to raise debt today, if it could possibly become

advantageous to raise debt in the future, the value of a
firm today with a management team unable to commit not to

do the 3-for-l exchange would be lower. For example, if
there is a 10% probability that the firm might want to
raise debt next year, it would then have to reduce its
debt price by $3 and lose $2 in firm value. If investors

are risk-neutral, with the 10% probability, the loss in
firm value today of the firm's inability to commit itself

in the future is thus 20 cents.
The important insight is that the cost of ex-post

actions is born not only by bondholders tomorrow, but also
by the owners today. Indeed, caveat emptor ("buyer

beware") applies; bond and stock purchasers can only be
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hurt to the extent that future opportunistic actions bymanagement are unforeseen surprises.

Thus, it is in management's (owners') own interest
today to commit not to exploit future owners and

bondholders tomorrow-especially if every one knows that

when the time comes, management would like to change its
mind. Another important insight is that competition can

force firms towards the best capital structure. When one
management team cannot commit not to do bad 3-for-l
exchanges and a firm with debt would be worth more than a

firm without debt, then another management team that can
commit can bid for the right to take over the firm-up to

the value that the firm is losing by not having debt.
Again, in general, a line emphasized throughout Welch's

article is that firms that can commit to do "the right
thing" tomorrow (ex-post) are worth more today (ex-ante).

It is a direct consequence that firms that maximize firm
value are worth more than firms that maximize equity

value.

Miller's famous "Debt and Taxes" paper (1977) cut us

loose from the extreme implications of the original Miller

and Modigliani theory, which made interest tax shields so
valuable that we cannot explain why all firms were not
awash in debt (Meyers, 1983). Miller described an
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equilibrium of an aggregate supply and demand for

corporate debt, in which personal income taxes paid by the
marginal investor in corporate debt just offset the
corporate tax saving. However, according to Myers, since
the equilibrium only determines aggregates, debt policy

should not matter for any single tax paying firm. Thus,

Miller's model allows us to explain the dispersion of
actual debt policies without having to introduce
non-value-maximizing managers (Meyers, 1983) .
The trouble is, according to Myers, this explanation

works only if we assume that all firms face approximately

the same marginal tax rate, and that is an assumption we

can immediately reject. The extensive trading of
depreciation tax shields and investment tax credits,
through financial leases and other devices, proves that

plenty of firms face low marginal rates.
Myers stated that the literature on costs of
financial distress supports two qualitative statements

about financing behavior:

1.

Risky firms ought to borrow less, other things

equal. Here, "risk" would be defined as the
variance rate of the market value of the firm's

assets. The higher the variance rate, the
greater the probability of default on any given
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package of debt claims. Since costs of financial

distress are caused by threatened or actual
default, safe firms ought to be able to borrow

more before expected costs of financial distress
offset the tax advantages of borrowing.
2.

Firms holding tangible assets-in-place having
active second-hand markets will borrow less than

firms holding specialized, intangible assets or
valuable growth opportunities. The expected cost

of financial distress depends not just on the

probability of trouble, but the value lost if
trouble comes. Specialized, intangible assets or
growth opportunities are more likely to lose

value in financial distress.

James H. Scott, Jr., in his article "Bankruptcy,
Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure,"

(1977)

defends the issuance of secured debt and its ability to
increase to total value of a firm, even in absence of
corporate tax. First, according to Scott, "A debt contract

is said to be secured if the borrower pledges an asset to

the lender with the provision that should the borrower
default on his agreement the lender has the right the
seize and sell the asset in question. Should the proceeds
from the sale exceed the amount owed to the lender, the
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excess is returned to the borrower or his estate. If the

proceeds are insufficient, the lender retains all of the
proceeds and becomes an unsecured creditor to the
remainder due him. In general, upon bankruptcy the
proceeds are distributed in the following order: secured

creditors, priority creditors (administrators of the
bankruptcy proceedings, tax collectors, certain wage

earners, etc.), unsecured creditors, stockholders."

Previous studies conducted by Kraus and Litzenberger
(1973), Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Stiglitz (1969)

have shown that in absence of tax, in frictionless markets
where there is no possibility for the firm to go bankrupt,

changes in its debt-equity ratio will not alter to total
market value of its debt plus its equity. Stiglitz (1969)

had shown that even if bankruptcy can occur, the
irrelevance of debt policy will follow if the individual
investor is permitted to purchase equity on margin paying

the same rate of interest as would the firm and using
his/her equity as collateral for the debt. The investor's

loan contract must also stipulate that the firm should go
bankrupt, the investor need only surrender his/her equity

to settle his/her margin debt (Stiglitz, 1969) .
However, in a more recent article entitled "Default

Risk, Scale, and the Homemade Leverage Theorem,"
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(1972)

Smith seems to disagree with the Stiglitz conclusion,
arguing that a rational lender would demand a higher

interest rate of the individual than of the firm. However,
Stiglitz dealt with the effect of an increase in the
amount of debt by a firm which initially had no debt and,

given that situation, according to Scott, Stiglitz's

reasoning is correct. On the other hand, if the firm
originally has debt-the Smith situation-and, increases it,
then a stronger condition is required for capital

structure irrelevancy.

More generally, Fama and Miller (1972) have argued
that if the capital market is what they call "perfect"

then even if bankruptcy is possible, firms cannot alter
the total market value of their outstanding securities by

issuing or retiring any type of security. One of the
conditions imposed by Fama and Miller is that securities

be defined so that they are protected against financing

actions by firms or by individuals, which would reduce the
value of the securities without adequate compensation.
However, not all of the liabilities of a firm.are
protected in the Fama-Miller sense and as a result, Scott
argues, that the issuance of secured debt can increase the

total market value of the firm. For example, he states
that one of the hazards of engaging in commercial activity
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lies in the fact that a disgruntled customer, supplier, or
injured party may file suit and win legal damages from the
firm. Since there is always the possibility that the firm

will be obliged to pay future legal damages, the present
value of expected damages constitute a liability of the
firm. By the issuance of secured debt, the firm can

increase the value of its securities by reducing the
amount available to pay legal damages in the event that

the firm should go bankrupt. This follows since Baumol and

Malkiel's article "The Firm's Optimal Debt Equity
Combination and the Cost of Capital,"

(1967) upon

bankruptcy the claim of a secured creditor to the assets

pledged as security ranks ahead of claims for legal

damages, and potential victors in legal suits are unable
to protect themselves from the issuance of secured debt

if, at the time of issuance, they do not yet have cause
for legal action. Other future costs not protected in the
Fama-Miller sense include sales taxes, property taxes,

excise taxes, and the administrative costs of bankruptcy.
The issuance of secured debt can increase firm value by
reducing the probability that these costs will be paid.

To close up his statement, Scott proves by his model
that it is possible for the firm to go bankrupt, but also

to raise funds in the capital market in an attempt
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(successful or not) to avoid bankruptcy. Valuation
formulas were derived for equity, subordinated debt, and

secured debt, and it was demonstrated that a firm
following an optimal policy should issue as much secured
debt as possible. The maximum amount of secured interest

payments was shown to be an increasing function of the
size of the firm, and of both the mean and variance of its

earnings stream. On the other hand, increases in the

default free rate of interest decreased the maximum amount
of secured interest payments. Finally, Scott shows the
effect of U.S. bankruptcy law on the ability of firms to

issue the type of secured debt.
Stuart M. Turnbull, in his article "Debt Capacity,"

(1979) confirms the position taken by Modigliani and

Miller vis-a-vis the use of debt in capital structure.

Turnbull states that in a world with corporate taxation,
where interest payments are tax deductible, it has long

been recognized that the issuance of debt can enhance the

value of the firm. The existence of various market
imperfections, adds Turnbull, can off-set the advantages

of debt, giving rise to the idea that there is a limit on
the amount of debt a firm should use and a limit on the
amount of debt the firm is allowed to use. The latter
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limit, according to Turnbull, has been termed the debt
capacity of the firm.

Finally, all this corporate finance literature over

the past several decades shows in general the imperative
usefulness of the employ of debt in capital structure. The
expression for the value of the levered firm can be used

to determine to optimal method of financing an investment
project, given the firm's capital structure. An

interesting result proved by Thomas E. Conine, Jr. in his
article "Corporate Debt and Corporate Taxes: An

Extension,"

(1980) was that the correlation between the

return of a levered firm and the market portfolio, a

primary input to the measurement of diversification
relative to the market, can be influenced by the financing

decision of the firm. That is, pure capital structure

rearrangements directly affect the relative amount of
diversifiable risk which investors are not compensated for

an efficient market characterized by risk aversion.
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CHAPTER THREE
NECESSITY AND ADVANTAGE OF THE
USE OF DEBT IN THE CAPITAL

STRUCTURE
Inside versus Outside Debt
Eugene Fama, in the article "What's Different About

Banks?,"

(1985) presents a distinction between inside and

outside debt. Inside debt, according to this article, is

defined as a loan for which the lender has access to
information about the borrower that is not otherwise
publicly available. The lender, for example, may

contribute in the firm's decision-making process as a
member of the board of directors. Outside debt, on the

contrary, is a publicly-traded claim, for which the debt
holder relies on publicly available information generated
by bond rating agencies, independent audits, or analyst

reports. Bank loans and privately places loans are

examples of inside debt, and publicly traded bonds and
commercial paper are examples of outside debt..
Inside Debt, in addition, seems to be a chief source

of financing for smaller public corporations as well as

privately held firms. As stated by Donald H. Chew, Jr. in
"The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice,"
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(2001) bank loans represented some 46 percent of debt
financing by U.S.

(non financial) corporations between

1977 and 1986. Private placements of bonds, which are
essentially loan sales to a limited number of investors

accounted for about 30 percent of all bond issues over the
same period.

Using inside debt has several advantages as pointed

out by Chew. First, inside debt may provide a possible

solution to the information asymmetry problem that attends
all public securities offerings. For example, to the

extent banks have better information about, and thus
greater confidence in, a given firm's future than

outsiders, they would price their loans to reflect this
information advantage. For firms with strong relationships

with local bankers, but no chance of gaining an investment
grade bond rating- maybe just for a matter of size- the

cost of a bank loan or private placement can be

significantly lower than the cost of borrowing through a
public securities offering.
Second, added Chew, inside debt holders are in a

better position to monitor the firm after the debt is

issued. Private placements and bank loans typically
contain detailed restrictive covenants, often

custom-tailored to the specific problems and opportunities
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of the borrower. Renegotiating the credit in response to
unexpected developments is much easier when there is only

one or several lenders then when there are several

hundreds or even thousands of anonymous investors. Also,

in the case of bank loans, firms may be able to lower

their debt costs by borrowing from banks with which they

maintain a deposit relationship, because these banks
already have information useful for evaluating and
monitoring credit quality.

Third, Chew adds that there may be a benefit to
maintaining confidentiality about the firm's investment

opportunities. Companies may not wish to reveal to the
public the information that lenders require. For example,

if a firm is raising capital for some investment the value
of which goes down if competitors learn about it prior to
its introduction, borrowing from private parties or from
insiders allows the firm to keep the investment secret
until introduction in the right time.

Finally, the use of inside debt allows borrowers to

avoid the costly and time-consuming process of registering
issues with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It
should be noted, however, that according to Chew, there
are also costs to negotiating inside debt and while the

fixed cost of public issues are relatively large, variable
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costs are small. For this reason, inside debt is more
likely to be used for smaller borrowings- that is, when

the size of the issues are not large enough to benefit
from the considerable economies of scale in floating new
public issues.

Chew mentioned also about the testable insinuation of

the hypothesis that bank loans and other types of private
debt keep away from the negative signal associated with

the public offerings is that announcements of such inside
debt transactions will have a positive consequence on the

stock prices of the borrowing firms. The loan approval
process itself may convey positive information to market

participants about the financial strength of the firm,
especially in the case of smaller firms without access to
public capital markets. Loan renewals and new extensions

may provide a credible seal of approval to equity
investors and further claimants of the firm, who
consequently need not undertake similar costly evaluations

of the firm's financial situation.
How Big is the Advantage of Debt

Tax Advantage
This section of the thesis explains the tax advantage

of debt in the capital puzzle of corporations in US
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economy. The relationship between the tax advantage of a
debt and annual rate of return advantage offered by

optimal leverage may be too small to make a difference
about the debt policy of the firms. In other words, the
range of debt to firm value ratios is indifferent about

the debt policy of the firms. However, the debt policy of
the firms is the important determinant of the bankruptcy
costs.

According to Ross Stephen, the experimental range of
debt-to-firm value ratios in the U.S. economy is from zero

to 60 percent (Ross, 1977). There are financial models to
investigate the capital structure of the firms. Some of
the those models pioneered by Turnbull in his article
entitled "Debt Capacity,"

(1979) focused on the tradeoff

between the tax shield and bankruptcy costs arising due to

the cost of debt and other models such as Ross (1977)
focused on information agency costs.
The issue of tax benefits of debt versus bankruptcy

cost is controversial. According to Miller in the article

"Debt and Taxes,"

(1977) the costs of bankruptcy are small

relatively to the tax benefits of the debt. Miller argues
this theory to explain the existence of unlevered firms.

On the other hand, DeAngelo and Masulis argue that the

bankruptcy costs and the net tax advantage to debt should
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be in equilibrium in order to offset the marginal
bankruptcy. DeAngelo and Masulis defend every firm's need

to structure its debt policy according to tax advantage
versus bankruptcy costs even if the bankruptcy costs are

relatively small if compared to the tax advantage.
The United States taxes corporate income, but

interest is a tax-deductible expense. A taxpaying firm

that pays an extra dollar of interest receives a partially

offsetting "interest tax shield" in the form of lower
taxes paid. Financing with debt instead of equity

increases the total after-tax dollar return to debt and

equity investors, and should increase firm value.
This present value of interest tax shields could be a

very big number. Suppose debt is fixed and permanent, as

Modigliani and Miller (1963) assumed, and that corporate
income is taxed at a current 35 percent statutory rate.

The firm borrows $1 million and repurchases and retires $1
million of equity. It commits itself to maintain this debt

level and to make annual interest payments for the
indefinite future. Absent taxes, this new debt does not

increase or decrease firm value: the firm is borrowing on
fair terms, so the money raised is exactly offset by the
present value of the future interest payments. But for a

taxpaying firm the net liability created by the $1 million
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debt issue is only $650,000, because, the Internal Revenue

Service effectively pays 35 percent of the interest
payments. The after-tax net present value of this
transaction would be NPV = + 1 - 0.65 = $0.35 million. The

gains from borrowing $10 million or $500 million scale up

proportionally (Myers, 2001).
Myers points out that such calculations are now
understood as remote upper bounds. First, the firm may not

always be profitable, so the average effective future tax
rate is less than the statutory rate. Second, debt is not

permanent and fixed. Investors today cannot know the size
and duration of future interest tax shields. "Debt
capacity" depends on the future profitability and value of

the firm. It may be able to increase borrowing if it does
well, or be forced to pay down debt if it does poorly. The

future interest tax shields flowing to investors are

therefore risky (Myers, 2001).

Third, according to Myers, the corporate-level tax
advantages of debt could be partly offset by the tax
advantage of equity to individual investors, namely, the

ability to defer capital gains and then to pay taxes at a

lower capital gains rate. The tax rate on investors'
interest and dividend income is higher than the effective

tax rate on equity income, which comes as a mixture of
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dividends and capital gains. Corporations should see this

relatively low effective rate as a reduction in the cost

of equity relative to the cost of debt.
The tax advantages of equity to investors could, in
some cases, offset the value of interest tax shields to

the corporation. For example, suppose Firm X's
shareholders are in the top individual tax bracket, paying

about 40 percent on a marginal dollar of interest or

dividends received. However, the firm pays no dividends,
so equity income comes entirely as capital gains. Suppose

the effective rate on capital gains is about 8 percent.
(The top-bracket capital gains rate is now 20 percent, and
payment can be deferred until shares are sold and the

gains realized). Then the total taxes paid on $100,000 of
Firm X's income are: 1) $35,000 in corporate taxes, plus

2) about $5,000 of (deferred) capital gains taxes (about 8
percent of the after-tax corporate income of $65,000).
Now Firm X borrows $1 million at 10 percent and

repurchases and retires $1 million of equity. It pays out

$100,000 per year in interest but saves $35,000 in taxes.

But investors receive $100,000 more in interest income and
$65,000 less in capital gains. Their taxes go up by
$40,000 - 5,000 = $35,000. There is no net gain once both
corporate and individual taxes are considered.
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Myers states that if these effective tax rates
applied generally to the marginal investors in debt and

equity securities, we would predict the equilibrium

"described by Miller (1977) .

The equilibrium is reached in the following way. As

the supply of debt from all corporations expands,
investors with higher and higher tax brackets have to be
enticed to hold corporate debt, and to receive more of

their income in the form of interest rather than capital
gains. Interest rates rise as more and more debt is

issued. So corporations face rising costs of debt relative
to their costs of equity.
Eventually the after-tax cost of debt becomes so high

that there is no gain from further borrowing. The supply

of debt increases until there is no further net tax

advantage. At that point, the effects of personal and
corporate taxes cancel out, and Modigliani and Miller's

Proposition 1 holds despite the tax-deductibility of
interest (Myers, 2001).

But actual tax rates do not appear to support this
equilibrium. Graham (2000) examines the interest rate

spread between corporate bonds and tax-exempt municipal

bonds to estimate the tax rate paid by marginal investors

in corporate debt.
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The rate is about 30 percent, well below the top
bracket. He also estimates the effective tax rate on

equity income at about 12 percent. Assume again that Firm
X borrows $1 million and pays out $100,000 of interest
yearly. It saves $35,000 in taxes. The marginal investor

in debt pays an extra $30,000 on interest income but saves

about $8,000 on equity income (about 12 percent of
$65,000). The net tax saving is $35,000 - (30,000 8,000) = $13,000. Thus the extra tax paid by investors

offsets more than half of the corporate interest tax
shield. Nevertheless, interest tax shields should still be

extremely valuable.
Graham's (2000) estimates are not definitive. We are
not sure who the relevant marginal investors are; much

less their effective tax rates (Myers, 2001). Yet, there

is a near consensus, among both practitioners and
economists, that there is a significant tax incentive for
corporate borrowing. Therefore, we should observe

corporations borrowing to exploit interest tax shields. If
there were no offsetting costs, they would attempt to

shield as much taxable income as possible, and in

equilibrium there would be no corporations paying taxes!
According to Myers, "This prediction is clearly wrong."
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There must be some costs attached to aggressive
borrowing. This leads to the tradeoff theory of capital

structure.
Taxes and the Tradeoff Theory. The tradeoff theory

justifies moderate debt ratios. It says that the firm will
borrow up to the point where the marginal value of tax

shields on additional debt is just offset by the increase

in the present value of possible costs of financial
distress (Myers, 2001). Financial distress refers to the

costs of bankruptcy or reorganization, and also to the
agency costs that arise when the firm's creditworthiness
is in doubt. For now, just assume that costs of financial
distress exist, and that the prospect of financial

distress can drag down the current market value of the

firm.
The tradeoff theory is in immediate trouble on the
tax front because it seems to rule out conservative debt
ratios by taxpaying firms. If the theory is right, a
value-maximizing firm should never pass up interest tax

shields when the probability of financial distress is
remotely low. Yet there are many established profitable
companies with superior credit ratings operating for years

at low debt ratios, including Microsoft and the major
pharmaceutical companies (Myers, 2001).
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These examples are not unusual. About half the firms
in Graham's (2000) sample were paying taxes at the full

statutory rate; the average firm in this sub sample could
have doubled its interest payments in confident
expectation of doubled interest tax shields. Graham (1996)
estimates that these companies could have added 7.5
percent on average to firm value by "levering up" to

still-conservative debt ratios. This is not small change.
A 7.5 percent deviation from Modigliani and Miller's

(1958) leverage-irrelevance proposition should prompt a

vigorous supply response from security issuers. One cannot
accept Modigliani and Miller's proposition and at the same

time ignore many mature corporations' evident lack of
interest in the tax advantages of debt (Myers, 2001).

Studies of the determinants of actual debt ratios
consistently find that the most profitable companies in a

given industry tend to borrow the least. For example, Wald

(1999) found that profitability was "the single largest
determinant of debt/asset ratios" in cross-sectional tests

for the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and

Japan.
High profits mean low debt, and vice versa. But if
managers can exploit valuable interest tax shields, as the

tradeoff theory predicts, we should observe exactly the
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opposite relationship. High profitability means that the
firm has more taxable income to shield, and that the firm

can service more debt without risking financial distress.
The tradeoff theory cannot account for the

correlation between high profitability and low debt
ratios. It does no good to say (without further

explanation) that managers are "excessively conservative"
or "not value-maximizing." That amounts to blaming

managers, rather than economists, for the failure of the
economists' theory. Also, Myers adds that an examination
of financing tactics quickly dismisses the idea that
managers don't pay attention to taxes.

Floating-rate preferred shares are creatures of the

tax code, and a clear illustration of the importance of
taxes in financing tactics (Myers, 2001). These preferred
dividend payments are tied to short-term interest rates.

This stabilizes the preferred dividends' prices. They are
purchased by other corporations with excess cash available
for short-term investment. The key tax advantage is that
only 30 percent of inter-corporate dividends are taxed

(Myers, 2001) . The effective corporate tax rate for
preferred dividends is therefore 0.3 x 0.35 = 0.105 or

10.5 percent. The financial innovators who first created

floating-rate preferred shares thus created a partially
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tax-exempt security that acted like a safe, short-term,

money-market instrument.
Financial leases are also largely tax-driven. When

the lessor's tax rate is higher than the lessee's, there
is a net gain because the lessor's interest and
depreciation tax shields are front-loaded. That is, they

are mostly realized earlier than the taxes paid on the
lease payments. The tax advantage is due to the time value

of money, and therefore increases in periods of high

inflation and high nominal interest rates (Myers, Dill, &
Bautista, 1977).
There are many further examples of tax-driven
financing tactics. Finding clear evidence that taxes have

a systematic effect on financing strategy, as reflected in
actual or target debt ratios, is much more difficult. In

Myers (1984, p. 588), after a review of the then-available

empirical work, the writer concluded that there was "no
study clearly demonstrating that a firm's tax status has a
predictable, material effect on its debt policy. I think

that the wait for such a study will be protracted."

A few such studies have since appeared although some
relate in part to financing tactics and none gives

conclusive support for the tradeoff theory. For example,
MacKie-Mason (1990) estimated a probity model for
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companies issuing debt or equity securities. He predicted
that companies with low marginal tax rates—for example

companies with tax loss carry-forwards—would be more
likely to issue equity, compared to more profitable
companies facing the full statutory tax rate. This was
clearly true in his sample.

MacKie-Mason's (1990) result is consistent with the
tradeoff theory, because it shows that taxpaying firms
favor debt. But it is also consistent with Miller's (1977)

equilibrium in which the value of corporate interest tax
shields is entirely offset by the low effective tax rate

on capital gains. In this case, a firm facing a low enough
tax rate would also use equity, because investors pay more

taxes on debt interest than on equity income. Thus, we
cannot conclude from MacKie-Mason's results that interest
tax shields make a significant contribution to the market

value of the firm or that debt ratios are determined by
the tradeoff theory (Myers, 2001).

Graham (1996) also finds evidence that changes in
long-term debt are positively and significantly related to

the firm's effective marginal tax rate. Again this.shows
that taxes affect financing decisions, at least at the

tactical level. It does not show that the present value of
interest tax shields is materially positive. Myers states
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that Fama and French (1998), despite an extensive

statistical search, could find no evidence that interest
tax shields contributed to the market value of the firm.

The tradeoff theory of optimal capital structure has

strong commonsense appeal. It rationalizes moderate debt
ratios. It is consistent with certain obvious facts, for
example, companies with relatively safe tangible assets

tend to borrow more than companies with risky intangible
assets (high business risk increases the odds of financial

distress, and intangible assets are more likely to sustain

damage if financial distress is encountered.) However, as
Myers affirms, "the words "consistent with" are

particularly dangerous in this branch of empirical
financial economics." He adds that a fact or statistical

finding is often consistent with two or more competing
capital structure theories. It is too easy to interpret

results as supporting the theory that one is used to.
The Evidence on Taxes. Theoretical models of optimal

capital structure predict that firms with more taxable
income and fewer non-debt tax shields should have higher

leverage ratios (Barclay & Smith, 1999). But the evidence

on the relation between leverage ratios and tax-related

variables is mixed at best. For example, studies that
examine the effect of non-debt tax shields on companies'
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leverage ratios find that this effect is either
insignificant, or that it enters with the wrong sign

(Barclay & Smith, 1999). That is, in contrast to the
prediction of the tax hypothesis, these studies suggest

that firms with more non debt tax shields such as
depreciation, net operating loss carry forwards and

investment tax credits have, if anything, more, not less
debt in their capital structures.

Barclay and Smith (1999) stressed out that before we

conclude that taxes are unimportant in the capital

structure decision, it is critical to recognize that the
findings of these studies are hard to interpret because

the tax variables are crude proxies for a company's
effective marginal tax rate. In fact, these proxies are

often correlated with other variables that influence the
capital structure choice. For example, companies with

investment tax credits, high levels of depreciation, and
other non-debt tax shields also tend to have mainly

tangible fixed assets. And, since fixed assets provide

good collateral, the non-debt tax shields may in fact be a

proxy not for limited tax benefits, but rather for low

contracting costs associated with debt financing (Barclay
& Smith, 1999). The evidence from the studies just cited
is generally consistent with this interpretation.
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Similarly, firms with net operating loss carry
forwards are often in financial distress; and, since
equity values typically decline in such circumstances,
financial distress itself causes leverage ratios to

increase. Thus, again, it is not clear whether net

operating losses proxy for low tax benefits of debt or for
financial distress.

More recently, several authors have succeeded in

detecting tax effects in financing decisions by focusing
on incremental financing choices (that is, changes in the
amount of debt or equity) rather than on the levels of
debt and equity. For example, the 1990 study by Jeffery

Mackie-Mason examined registered security offerings by
public U.S. corporations and found that firms were more
likely to issue debt if they had a high marginal tax rate
and to issue equity if they had a low tax rate. In another

attempt to avoid the difficulties with crude proxy
variables, the 1996 study by John Graham used a
sophisticated simulation method to provide a more accurate

measure of companies' marginal tax rates. Using such tax

rates, Graham also found a positive association between

changes in debt ratios and the firm's marginal tax rate.
On balance, then, the evidence appears to suggest
that taxes play at least a modest role in corporate
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financing and capital structure decisions. Moreover, as

will be mentioned in the coming section of other
advantages of the use of debt in capital structure, the

results of the tests of contracting costs reported above
can also be interpreted as evidence in support of tax
explanation.
Other Advantages

Myers (1984), based in part on the argument in Myers

and Majluf (1984), introduces the pecking order theory of
capital structure. The major prediction of the model is

that firms will not have a target or optimal capital
structure, but will instead follow a pecking order of

incremental financing choices that places internally
generated funds at the top of the order, followed by debt

issues, and finally, only when the firm reaches its "debt
capacity," it will use new equity financing. This theory

is based upon costs derived from asymmetric information
between managers and the market and the idea that tradeoff

theory costs and benefits to debt financing are of second
order importance when compared to the costs of issuing new

securities. The development of a pecking order based upon
costs of adverse selection requires an ad hoc

specification of the manager's incentive and a limitation
on the types of financing strategies that may be pursued.
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Despite these theoretical criticisms, the pecking order
theory remains one of the predominant theories of the

incremental financing choice (Myers, 1984).
Contracting Costs. Conventional capital structure

analysis holds the financial managers set leverage targets
by balancing the tax benefits of higher leverage against

the grater probability, and thus higher expected costs, of
financial distress. In this view, the optimal capital

structure is the one in which the next dollar in debt is

expected to provide an additional tax subsidy that just
offsets the resulting increase in expected costs of
financial distress.

Costs of Financial Distress. Although the direct
expenses associated with the administration and the
bankruptcy processes appear to be quite small relative to

the market values of companies, the indirect costs can be
substantial (Barclay & Smith, 1999). In thinking about
optimal capital structure, the most important indirect

costs are likely to be the reductions in firm value that

result from cutbacks in promising investment that tend to
be made when companies get into financial difficulty.

When a company files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
judge effectively assumes control of corporate investment

policy-and it is not hard to imagine the circumstances in
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which judges do not maximize firm value. But even in
conditions less extreme than bankruptcy, highly leveraged

companies are more likely that their low-debt .counterparts
to pass up valuable investment opportunities, especially

when faced with the prospect of default. In such cases,
corporate managers are likely not only to postpone major
capital projects, but to make cutbacks in R & D,
maintenance, advertising, or training that end up reducing

future profits.

This tendency of companies to under-invest when
facing financial difficulty is attenuated by conflicts

that can arise among the firm's different claimholders. To
illustrate this conflict, Barclay and Smith (1999)

considered what might happen to a high-growth company that
had trouble servicing its debt. Since the value of such a

firm will depend heavily on its ability to carry out its

long-term investment plan, what the company needs is an
infusion of equity. But there is a problem. As Stewart

Myers points out in his classic 1977 article entitled
"Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," the investors who
would be asked to provide the new equity in such cases

recognize that much of the value created (or preserved) by

their investment would go to restoring the creditors'
position. In this situation, the cost of the new equity
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could be so high that managers acting on their

shareholders' behalf might rationally forgo both the
capital and the investment opportunities.
Myers refers to this as "the underinvestment

problem." And as he still argues, companies whose value
consists primarily of intangible investment opportunitiesor "growth opting," as he called them- will choose low

debt capital structures because such firms are likely to

suffer the greatest loss in value from this

underinvestment problem. By contrast, mature companies
with few profitable investment opportunities where most of

their value reflects the cash flows from tangible "assets
in place" incur lower expected costs associated with
financial distress. Such mature companies, all else equal,

should have significantly higher leverage ratios than

high-growth firms.

The Benefits of Debt in Controlling Overinvestment.

If too much debt financing can create an underinvestment
problem for growth companies, too little debt can lead to
an over-investment problem in the case of mature

companies. As Michael Jensen has argued, large, mature
public companies generate substantial free cash flow- that

is, operating cash flow that cannot be profitably
reinvested inside the firm. The natural inclination of
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corporate managers is to use such free cash flow to
sustain growth at the expense of profitability, either by

over investing in their core businesses or, perhaps worse,

by diversifying through acquisition into unfamiliar ones.
Because both of these strategies tend to reduce

value, companies that aim to maximize firm value must
distribute their free cash flow to investors. Raising the

dividend is one way of promising to distribute excess

capital. But major substitutions of debt to equity offer a

more reliable solution because contractually obligated

payments of interest and principal are more effective than
discretionary dividend payments in squeezing our excess

capital. Thus, in industries generating substantial cash

flow but facing few growth opportunities, debt financing
can add value simply by forcing managers to be more

critical in evaluating capital spending plans (Barclay &
Smith, 1999).

Evidence on Contracting Costs. Much of the evidence
on capital structure supports the conclusion that there is

an optimal capital structure and that firms make financing

decisions and adjust their capital structures to move
closer to the optimum (Barclay & Smith, 1999).
For example, some studies have used cross-sectional

regression techniques to test whether the theoretical
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determinants of an optimal capital structure actually

affect financing decisions. For example, in their 1984

study, Michael Bradley, Gregg Jarrell, and Han Kim found
that the debt to (book) asset ratio was negatively related

to both the volatility of annual operating earnings and to

advertising and R&D expenses. Both of these findings are
consistent with high costs of financial distress for

growth companies which tend to have more volatile earnings

as well as higher spending on R&D.

According to Barclay and Smith (1999), when firms get
into financial difficulty, complicated capital structures

with claims of different priorities can generate serious

conflicts among creditors, thus .exacerbating the

underinvestment problem described earlier. And because
such conflicts and the resulting underinvestment have the

greatest potential to destroy value in growth firms, those

growth firms that do issue fixed claims are likely to

choose mainly high-priority fixed claims.

Information Costs. Corporate executives often have
better information about the real value of their companies
than outside investors. Recognition of this information
disparity between managers and investors has led to two

distinct but related theories of financing decisions- one

known as signaling, the other as the pecking order.

61

Signaling. With better information about the value of

their companies than outside investors, managers of
undervalued firms would like to raise their share prices

by communicating this information to the market.

Unfortunately, according to Barclay and Smith (1999), this
task is not as easy as it sounds; simply announcing that
the companies are undervalued is generally not enough. The

challenge for managers is to find a credible signaling

mechanism.

Economic theory suggests that information disclosed
by an obviously biased source (like management, in this
case) will be credible only if the costs of communicating

falsely are large enough to constrain managers to reveal

the truth. Increasing leverage has been suggested as one

potentially effective signaling device (Barclay & Smith,
1999). Debt contracts oblige the firm to make a fixed set
of cash payments over the life of the loan; if these

payments are missed, there are potentially serious
consequences, including bankruptcy. Equity is more

forgiving (Barclay & Smith, 1999). Although stockholders
also expect cash payouts, managers have more discretion
over these payments and can cut or omit them in times of
financial distress.
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For this reason, adding more debt to the firm's
capital structure can serve as a credible signal of higher
future cash flows. By committing the firm to make future
interest payments to bondholders, managers communicate

their confidence that the firm will have sufficient cash

flows to meet these obligations.
Debt and equity also differ with respect to their

sensitivity to changes in firm value. Since the promised
payments to bondholders are fixed, and stockholders are

entitled to the residual (or what's left over after the
fixed payments), stock prices are much more sensitive than
bond prices to any proprietary information about future

prospects (Barclay & Smith, 1999). If management is in

possession of good news that has yet to be reflected in
market prices, the release of such news will cause a
larger increase in stock prices than in bond prices; and

hence current stock prices (prior to the release of the
new information) will appear more undervalued to managers

than current bond prices. For this reason, signaling

theory suggests that managers of companies that believe
their assets are undervalued will generally choose to

issue debt- and to use equity only as a last resort.
To illustrate this with a simple example, let's

suppose that the market price of a stock is $10.00.

63

Investors understand that its real value-that is, the

value they would assign if they had access to the same
information as the firm's managers- might be as high as

$12.00 or as low as $8.00; but given the investors'

available information, $10.00 is a fair price. Now let's

suppose that the managers want to raise external funds and
they could either sell equity or debt. If the managers
think the stock is really worth only $8.00, selling shares
for $10.00 will be attractive- especially if their

compensation is tied to stock appreciation. But if the
managers think the stock is really worth $12.00, equity

would be expensive at $10.00 and debt would be more

attractive.
The investors understand this and so if the company
announces an equity offer, investors reassess the current

price in the light of this new information. Since it is
more likely that the stock is worth $8.00 than $12.00, the
market price declines. Such a rapid adjustment in
valuation associated with the announcement thus eliminates

much of any potential gain from attempting to exploit the
manager's superior information.
Consistent with this example, many economists have

documented that the market responds in systematically

negative fashion to announcements of equity offerings,
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marking down the share prices of issuing firms to a new
equilibrium price. By contrast, the average market

reaction to new debt offerings is not significantly
different from zero. The important thing to recognize is

that most companies issuing new equity - those that are
undervalued as well as those that are overvalued - can

expect a drop in stock prices when they announce the
offering (Barclay & Smith, 1999). For those firms that are
fairly valued or undervalued prior to the announcement of

the offering, this expected drop in value represents an
economic strength of the existing shareholders' interest.
The Pecking Order. The signaling theory, then, says

that the financing decisions are based, at least in part,

on management's perception of the fairness of the market's
current valuation of the stock. Stated as simply as

possible, the theory suggests that in order to minimize

the information costs of issuing securities, a company is
more likely to issue debt than equity if the firm appears
undervalued, and to issue equity stock rather than debt if

the firm seems overvalued.
The pecking order theory takes this argument one step

further. According to Barclay and Smith (1999), this
theory suggests that the information costs associated with
issuing securities are so large that they dominate all
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other considerations. According to this theory, the

companies maximize value by systematically choosing to
finance new investments with the cheapest available source

of funds. Specifically, they prefer debt to equity because

of the lower information costs associated with debt
issues. Companies issue equity only as a last resort, when
their debt capacity has been exhausted.
Barclay and Smith (1999) stressed out that the

pecking order theory would thus suggest that companies

with few investment opportunities and substantial free
cash flow will have low debt ratio and that high-growth
firms with lower operating cash flows will have high debt

ratios. Consequently, the theory suggests that interest
tax shields and the cost of financial distress are at most

a second-order concern; in addition, the logic of the
pecking order actually leads to a set of forecasts that

are accurately the opposite of those offered by the tax

and contracting cost arguments obtainable above.
The Evidence on Information Costs. The signaling

theory says that companies are more likely to issue debt
then equity when they are undervalued because of the large

information costs (in the form of dilution) associated

with the equity offering. The pecking order model goes
even further, suggesting that the information costs
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associated with riskier securities are so large that most

companies will not issue equity until they have completely
exhausted their debt capacity. Neither the signaling

theory nor the pecking order offers any clear prediction

about what optional capital structure would be for a given
firm (Barclay & Smith, 1999). The signaling theory seems
to suggest that a firm's actual capital structure will be

influenced by whether the company is perceived by
management to be undervalued or overvalued. Barclay and
Smith affirmed that the pecking order is even more

extreme: it implies that a company will not have a target
capital structure, and that its leverage ratio will be

determined by the gap between its operating cash flow and
its investment requirements over time. Thus, the pecking

order predicts that companies with consistently high
profits or modest financing requirements are likely to
have low debt ratios-mainly because they do not need

outside capital. Less profitable companies, on the other

hand, and those with large financing requirements, will
end up with high leverage ratios because of the managers'

reluctance to issue equity.

A number of studies provide support to the pecking
order theory in the form of evidence of a strong negative

correlation coefficient between past probability and
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leverage. That is, the lower a company's profits and

operating cash flows in a given year are, the higher its

leverage ratio is (Barclay & Smith, 1999). Moreover, in an

article published in 1998, Myers and Lakshmi added to this
series of studies by showing that this relation explains
more of the time-series variance of debt ratios than a
simple target-adjustment model of capital structure that

is consistent with the contracting cost hypothesis.
Such findings have generally been interpreted as
confirmation that managers do not set target leverage

ratios-or at least do not work very hard to achieve them
(Barclay & Smith, 1999). But this is not the only

interpretation that fits this data. Even if companies have
target leverage ratios, there will be an optimal deviation

from those targets: one that will depend on the

transactions costs associated with adjusting back to the
target relative to the costs of deviating from the target.

To the extent there are fixed costs and scale economies in

issuing securities, companies with capital structure
targets-particularly smaller firms- will make infrequent

adjustments and often will deliberately overshoot their
targets.
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Maturity and Priority
The signaling theory implies that undervalued firms

have more short-term debt and more senior debt than
undervalued firms because such instruments are less

sensitive to the market's assessment of firm value and
thus will be less undervalued when issued. The findings of

Barclay and Smith's (1999) study are inconsistent with the

predictions of the signaling hypothesis with respect to
debt maturity. In fact, companies whose earnings were

about to increase the following year issued less
short-term debt and more long-term debt than firms whose

earnings were about to decrease. And, whereas the theory
predicts more senior debt for firms about to experience

earnings increases, the ratio of senior debt to total debt

is lower for overvalued than for undervalued firms.
In the sum, the results of Barclay and Smith's (1999)
tests of managers' use of financing choices to signal
their superior information to the market are not robust,

and the economic effect of any such signaling on corporate
decision making seems minimal.

According to the pecking order theory, the firm
should issue as much of the security with the lowest

information costs as it can. Only after this capacity is
exhausted should it move on the issue of security with
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higher information costs. Thus, for example, firms should
issue as much secured debt or capitalized leases as

possible before issuing any unsecured debt, and they
should exhaust their capacity for issuing short-term debt
before issuing any long-term debt. But these predictions
are clearly rejected by the data. For example, Barclay and

Smith (1999) examined the capital structures of over 7,000
companies between 1980 and 1977 (representing almost
57,000 firm-year observations), they found that 23% of
these observations had no secured debt, 54% had no capital

leases, and 50% had no debt that was originally issued

with less than one year to maturity.
To explain these more detailed aspects of capital
structure, proponents of the pecking order theory must go

outside their theory and argue that other costs and

benefits determine their choices. But according to Barclay
and Smith (1999), once you allow for these other costs and
benefits to have a material impact on corporate financing

choices, you are back in the more "traditional domain" of

optimal capital structure theories.
The Role of Bank Loans Raising Capital
and Optimizing Capital Structure

In a frictionless capital market, firms are always

able to secure funding for positive NPV projects. In the
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presence of information asymmetry in which the firm's
quality and the quality of its investment projects cannot
be easily evaluated by the outside capital markets, firms

may be unable to raise sufficient capital to fund all of
their good projects. Such market frictions create the

possibility for differentiated markets or institutions to
arise (Faulkender & Petersen, 2002) . Financial

intermediaries are lenders that specialize in collecting

information about borrowers, a collection which is then
used in the credit approval decision. By interacting with

borrowers over time and across different products, the
banker may be able to partially alleviate the information
asymmetry which is the cause of the market's failure

(Faulkender & Petersen, 2002) .
Financial intermediaries such as banks may also have

an advantage over arms length lenders (such as bond
markets) after the capital is provided. If ex-post
monitoring raises the probability of success (either
through enforcing efficient project choice or enforcing

the expenditure of the owner's effort), then they may be a
preferred source of capital. Financial intermediaries may

also be better at efficient restructuring of firms which
are in financial distress (Faulkender & Petersen, 2002) .
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The literature has often described banks (or private

lenders) as being particularly good at investigating
informational opaque firms and deciding which are viable

borrowers. This suggests that the source of the capital

may be intimately related to the firms' ability to access
debt markets. Firms which are opaque (and thus difficult

to investigate ex-ante) or which have more discretion in

their investment opportunities (and thus difficult for
lenders to constrain contractually) are more likely to
borrow from active lenders and are also the type of firms

which theory predicts may be constrained. In this paper, I

am concerned about investigating the link between where
firms obtain their capital (the private versus the public
debt markets) and the contribution of the debt in the

capital. I am going to briefly describe the tradeoff
between financial intermediaries (the private debt

markets) which have an advantage at collecting information

and restructuring firms, but are a potentially more
expensive source of capital, and arm's length lenders (the
public debt markets). The higher cost of capital may be

due to the expenditure on monitoring or because of the tax

disadvantage of the lender's organizational form.
Additionally, not all firms may be able to choose the

source of their debt capital. If firms which do not have
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access to the public debt markets are constrained by

lenders in the amount of debt capital they may raise, we

should see this in their lower debt ratios.

Debt ratios should depend upon firm characteristics
as well. Thus a difference in leverage does not imply that
firms are constrained by the debt markets. This difference

could be the product of firms with different
characteristics optimally making different decisions about

leverage. This, however, does not appear to be the case.
Even after controlling the firm characteristics which, as

theory and previous empirical work argue, determine a
firm's choice of leverage, we still find that firms with

access to the public debt market have higher leverage that

is both economically and statistically significant
(Faulkender & Petersen, 2002). Finally, we consider the

possibility that the choice of whether to gain access to
the public debt markets (obtain a debt rating) is
endogenous. Even after controlling the endogeneity of a
debt rating, we find that firms with access to the public
debt markets have significantly higher leverage ratios

(Faulkender & Petersen, 2002) .

This intuition is the basis of the empirical
literature which has examined the firm's choice of lender.

Firms that are riskier, smaller and about which less is
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known are the firms most likely to borrow from financial
intermediaries. Larger firms about which much is known

will be more likely to borrow from public capital markets

(Faulkender & Petersen, 2002).
The monitoring done by financial intermediaries and

the resources spent on restructuring firms, however, is
costly (Faulkender & Petersen, 2002). Its cost must
therefore be passed back to the firm and this means that

the cost of the capital for firms in this imperfect market

depends not only on the risk of their projects but also on

the resources needed to verify the viability of their
projects. If monitoring is costly and imperfect, and if we

compare two firms with identical projects, we will find
that the one which needs to be monitored (for example if

the owner does not have a track record), will have a
different cost of (debt) capital. The cost of monitoring

will be passed on to the borrower in the form of higher

interest rates. This will cause the firm to reduce its use
of debt capital. In addition, if the monitoring and
additional information collection performed by the

financial intermediary cannot eliminate the information
asymmetry completely, credit may still be allowed.
To sum up the role and necessity of the use of debt
in the capital structure, I developed a numerical example
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explaining the different processes in capital structure
puzzle. I got inspired from class notes in corporate
finance and summarized all the steps I already mentioned

through the literature I presented above.
The question I am going to answer is: does capital

structure matter?

A firm consists of assets which produce a stream of
cash flows. The capital structure decision determines how
those assets will be paid for, and thus how the cash flows

will be allocated among different claims (debt, equity,

etc.). From this point, an important question derives: Can
the firm increase the value of its assets by issuing a
particular set of securities?

We first isolate the capital structure decision by

holding investment and dividend policy fixed; Modigliani
and Miller's (MM's) Proposition I states that in perfect
markets, the value of a firm's assets is unaffected by the

mix of securities used to finance the purchase of the
assets.

The proof relies on the fact that investors can do
(or undo) any actions that firms can take.

Suppose that two firms have the same assets (that

generate the same operating earnings), and differ only in
how the assets are financed:
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and so its assets and

Firm U is unlevered (no debt)

equity are both worth the same amount

(Vu= Su = $100,000)

Firm L is levered (uses debt - say $25,000) and so the

value of the equity is equal to: SL = VL - BL = VL - $25,000.

Consider two different investments:
1.

buy 15% of firm U' s stock

2.

buy 15% of firm 1/ s debt and stock

For investment 1:

Dollar
Investment

Dollar
Return

For investment 2:

Dollar
Investment

Dollar Return

Debt
Equity
Total
Figure 1.

Investment/Return Chart for Investments 1 and 2

Both investments offer the same return

(and have the

same risk), and so must sell for the same price today.

Thus 0.15 Vu = 0.15 VL, or Vu = VL = $100,000. The levered

and unlevered firms are worth the same.
Now consider the following investments:

3.

Buy 15% of firm 1/ s stock

4.

Borrow $0.15 BL = $3,750, and buy 15% of firm

U's stock for $15,000.
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For investment 3:
Dollar Return

Dollar
Investment

For investment 4:

Dollar
Investment

Dollar Return

Debt
Equity
Total
Figure 2.

Investment/Return Chart for Investments 3 and 4

Again, both investments offer the same payoff, and

therefore must sell for the same price today. This says

that 0.15

(VL - Bl) = 0.15

(Vo - BL) , or VL = Vo. The value

of the levered firm is the same as the unlevered firm.

In both cases, the irrelevance of capital structure
depended on investors' ability to undo any effects of the
differences in capital structure.

In particular, investors

must be able to borrow or lend on the same terms as the
firm.
Some Restatements of Modigliani and Miller
Proposition I

1.

If shares of levered firms are priced too high,
investors will borrow by themselves and use the
money to buy shares in unlevered firms. This is
sometimes called homemade leverage.
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2.

If shares of unlevered firms are too high,

investors will buy shares in levered firms and
put money in bonds.

3.

In order for capital structure to matter, there
must be some market imperfections that allow the

firm to do something that investors cannot do

for themselves.

A counter-argument to Modigliani and Miller I?
Individuals cannot borrow as easily and cheaply as firms.
Wouldn't investors be willing to pay a premium for

investment 3 (firm L's equity?).

Answer. Market imperfections are a necessary, but not
a sufficient, condition for capital structure to matter.

There must be an unsatisfied clientele for shares in
levered firms. There are a zillion levered firms available

to invest in. How could a firm increase its value by

becoming the zillion-and-first?

Another Restatement of Modigliani and Miller I
Capital structure matters when firms find an untapped

demand among investors and satisfy it with a new security.
In a competitive market for securities your firm is

unlikely to be consistently first to the market with a new
security.
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Leverage and Returns

The expected return on a portfolio is the weighted

average of the expected returns of its component
securities (weighted average cost of capital) :

r0 = (B/V) rB + (S/V) rs => rs = r0 + (B/S)

(r0 - rB )

rWACC = r0
Since portfolio betas are also weighted averages of

component betas we can also write:
ps = Po + (B/S)

(po - PB)

An aside: with taxes we write MM Proposition II as:
rs = r0 + (B/S)

(1-TC )

(r0 - rB )

The Bottom Line
In perfect capital markets, capital structure is

irrelevant. However, even market imperfections per se are
not enough to make debt policy matter.

In the next section, we will examine two market
imperfections that do make capital structure matter: taxes

and the costs of financial distress.

What can explain firms' financing choices? We focus
on two market imperfections that we ignored in the last
chapter: taxes and the costs of financial distress.

Taxes

If we assume constant cash flows; and EBIT is the
total cash flow of the firm before interest and taxes,
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ignoring depreciation and other such items as taxes, then
the taxable income of a 100%-equity financed firm equals

EBIT
For a 100%-equity financed firm, total taxes are
EBITxTc
and earnings after taxes are
EBITx(1-Tc)

taxable income for a levered firm
EBIT - rBB

>

total taxes in a levered firm are
(EBIT - rBB) xTc
cash flow going to stockholders

EBIT - rBB - Tex(EBIT - rBB) = (EBIT - rBB) x(l-Tc)
cash flow going to stockholders and bondholders

EBITx(l-Tc) +■TcrBB

EBIT
Interest
Taxable Income
Tax @ 34%
Net Income
Payments to stockholders and bondholders
Interest tax shield (34% x interest)
Figure 3. Firm U/Firm L Tax Shields Chart
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Firm U
1000
0
1000
340
660
660
0

Firm L
1000
80
920
321.80
607.20
687.20
27.20

NB: Assume that the tax rate for the firms is T

34

and that the interest rate for the loan is 8%.
Firm L has borrowed $1000 at 8%. The government pays

34% of L's interest bill, increasing the total income
available for payout to both stockholders and bondholders.

If L's debt is "permanent," the firm can enjoy a

perpetual $27.20 tax break from using debt. If we discount
this cash flow at the rate of return on the debt, we have:
PV tax shield = 27.20/0.08 = 340 = TCD.

Note that the PV of tax shields may be less if the
debt is not permanent, or if there is uncertainty about

realizing the tax shields.
This leads to MM's "corrected" Proposition I:

Value of firm = value if all-equity financed + PV
of tax shield

VL = Vu + Tc D
Implication

Unfortunately, MM's corrected Proposition I implies
that 100% debt financing is optimal. Aside from the
logical impossibility of this prescription, we don't
observe firms with market value debt ratios anything close

to 100% (unless they're about to go bankrupt).

There are 2 possible omissions from the theory which
could explain why "corrected Proposition I" doesn't
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describe reality (Schlingemann, 1996) . The first is
personal taxes; the second is financial distress and
agency costs.

Personal Taxes
In the prior example, the firm can deduct interest
from its corporate tax bill. But, that interest may be

taxable to the bondholder. In contrast, if the firm pays
no interest but retains all its earnings, shareholders may

pay no taxes (if they don't realize the capital gain).

What does this imply for the relevance of corporate
financing?

Corporate tax

EBIT = $1
If paid as
If paid as
interest
equity income
0
Tc

Income after tax

$1

$1-TC

Personal tax

tb

(l-Tc)Ts

1-Tb

(1-TS) (1-Tc)

Income after all taxes

Figure 4. Firm U/Firm L Income After Tax
Borrowing is better if 1-TB.exceeds (1-TS)

(1-Tc) ;

otherwise equity financing is better.

Suppose all equity income comes from dividends (or
all capital gains are realized immediately). Then the
relative advantage is 1/(1-TC) , since TB and Ts are equal.
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Since this is greater than 1.0, MM are right - use as much
debt as you can.
For debt policy to be irrelevant again, we need
1-Tb

=

(1-TS)

(1-TC) . This essentially requires the

corporate rate to be less than the personal rate, and for

Ts to be very small.
Costs of Financial Distress

Value of firm = Value if all equity financed + PV of

tax shield - PV of costs of financial distress If the
costs of financial distress are positive, this implies

that 100% debt financing is NOT optimal.
What are the Costs of Financial Distress?

Bankruptcy Costs. Bankruptcy is a legal mechanism
that allows firms to renegotiate the terms of their debt

contracts. Direct bankruptcy costs are the costs of using
this legal framework (Schlingemann, 1996).

Indirect bankruptcy costs measure the loss in value

realized when customers and suppliers abandon a bankrupt
firm. These are hard to measure because it's hard to

disentangle cause and effect, but reasonable estimates are

between 8 and 15% of firm value. NB: It is not the
probability of bankruptcy per se that reduces firm value,
but rather the costs of bankruptcy (Schlingemann, 1996) .
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
In addition to explaining the basic leverage (debt

vs. equity) decision, a functional theory of capital

structure should also help explain other capital structure

choices, such as debt maturity, priority, the use of
callability and convertibility provisions, and the choice
between public and private financing. As discussed above,
the contracting-cost theory provides a unified framework
for analyzing the entire range of capital structure

choices while most other theories, such as signaling and
pecking order theories, are at best silent about-and more

often inconsistent with- the empirical evidence on these

issues.
We can also take this argument a little further to

say that a productive capital structure theory should also
help explain an even broader array of corporate financial

policy choices, including dividend, compensation, hedging

and leasing policies. The empirical evidence suggests that
companies choose coherent packages of these financial

policies (Barclay & Smith, 1999). For example, Barclay and
Smith (1999) add that small high-growth firms tend to have

not only low leverage ratios and simple capital structures
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(with predominately short-maturity, senior hank debt), but
also low dividend payouts as well as considerable

stock-based incentive compensation for senior executives.
By contrast, large mature companies tend to have high
leverage, more long-term debt, more complicated capital
structures with a broader range of debt priorities, higher

dividends, and less incentive compensation (with higher
reliance on earnings-based bonuses rather than stock-based

compensation plans). Thus, corporate financing, dividend

and compensation policies, besides being highly correlated
with each other, all appear to be driven by the same

fundamental firm characteristics: investment opportunities
and (to a lesser extent) firm size (Chew, 2001) . This
consistent pattern of corporate decision-making suggests
that we now have the rudiments of a unified framework for

explaining most, if not all, financing policy choices.
As mentioned earlier, proponents of the pecking order

theory argue that the information costs associated with
issuing new securities dominate all other costs in

determining capital structure. But, the logic and

predictions of the pecking order theory are at odds with,

and thus incapable of explaining, most other financial
policy choices. For example, in suggesting that firms will
always use the cheapest source of funds, the model implies
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that companies will not simultaneously pay dividends and

access external capital markets. But this prediction can,
of course, be rejected simply by glancing at the business
section of most daily newspapers. With the exception of a

few extraordinary high tech companies like Microsoft and
Amgen, most large, publicly traded companies pay dividends

while at the same time regularly rolling over existing
debt with new public issues. As already discussed,

although the pecking order theory predicts that mature
firms that generate lots of free cash flow should
eventually become all equity financed, they are among the

most highly levered firms in Barclay and Smith's (1999)
sample. Conversely, the pecking order theory implies that
high-tech startup firms will have high leverage ratios
because they often have negative free cash flow and incur

the largest information costs when issuing equity. But, in
fact, such firms are financed almost entirely with equity
(Barclay & Smith, 1999).
Thus, as in the case of debt maturity and priority,

proponents of the pecking order must go outside of their
theory to explain corporate behavior at both ends of the
corporate growth spectrum. In so doing, they implicitly

limit the size and importance of information costs; they
concede that, at least for the most mature and
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highest-growth sectors, information costs are less

important than other considerations in corporate financing
decisions.

After opposing the above schools of thoughts and

theories all the way since more than half a century, I
would like to ask the same question that Myers asked in
his 1984 article entitled "The Capital Structure Puzzle":

"How do firms choose their capital structure?" Well, after

going through the different theories, I am aligning myself
to Myers' answer "We don't know."
It is very lucid that the capital structure theories
have explained a good part of the capital structure

decision-making actions, but I still believe that they do
not explain with certitude all the managers' behaviors in

constructing their firms' capital structures. On the one
hand, the pecking order theory fails to explain some

firms' financial structure as described in the high-tech
industries example above; and in such a manner, we feel we
cannot totally rely on this theory. On the.other hand, the

tradeoff theory is not perfect either. For example, as I
mentioned earlier, the tradeoff theory cannot account for

the correlation between high profitability and low debt

ratios. It does no good to say that managers are

"excessively conservative" or "not-value-maximizing." I
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strongly think that none of the existing theories in

capital structure is a perfect model explaining managers'

behaviors and that we can recommend as sculpt to be
followed by business leaders.
To sum up, let's ask ourselves: why should the firm's
managers be concerned today about the firm's future

ability to expropriate its bondholders or potential other

equity investors, or to pursue suboptimal real investment
strategies? After all, it could benefit their clientele,

current equity. Yet, upon reflection, it becomes clear
that when investors, can be expropriated in the future,
they will demand a higher compensation upfront. This

reduces the firm's financing flexibility, and thus
typically forces firms to offer a higher expected rate of

return today to issue their preferred capital structure,
or to make compromises and forego some positive NPV

projects. By the same token, a firm that is more likely to
take only the best projects in the future is worth more

today. A firm that has both debt and equity, rather than
equity only, may not be able to commit itself to the best

future actions, resulting in a loss of value and

competitive advantage today.
The real world is considerably more complex in that

firms typically do not face each of the above problems in
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isolation, but all at the same time. The presence of one

problem may worsen another. For example, there can be
significant costs to move from a suboptimal to an optimal
capital structure. If a firm is close to bankruptcy,

issuing equity could avoid or reduce bankruptcy costs,
which increase firm value. But the infusion of more equity

may mostly benefit bondholders, so equity holders may not
be inclined to issue more equity. So, although capital
structure reorganization could install a new capital
structure to increase firm value, there are problems to be

resolved to get there, given the current capital
structure.
Ultimately, the trick in being a good manager is to
weigh costs and benefits of projects, debts, and equity,

and to have sound judgment in deciding on a good
combination thereof. Although we have seen a multitude of
theories explaining the crowds of forces interacting to
get a better capital structure, choosing a good capital

structure remains as much an art as it is a science.
In addition, I think that the tradeoff theory is more

of the model I would recommend for use with coordination
with the pecking order theory. The tradeoff model suggests
keeping a target debt ratio that rationalizes the firm

capital structure and financing behavior. This is a
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coherent model that keeps the financial managers'
forecasts and analysis safe to some extent. If we add to
this model some use of the pecking order, this will lead

the capital structure to a conservative and safe pavement
protecting the firm's value. This might push the research

to a tradeoff between the existing tradeoff theory and the
pecking order model.

The question I am going to answer is "How should we
proceed to get such a swapping model out of the existing

theories?"
If we can find a balanced model trading between these

two theories, it will possibly be the new alternative for

managers to scientifically set up their firms' capital

structures. A good line of attack I would recommend this
balanced theory to come into view is to choose a bucket of

optimal firms (that we assume they should be our target
from a performance perspective) and elaborate an empirical
study on the mixture of their capital structures to

extract the common features of the structures of their
capitals. If we start from the point where we assume the

tradeoff theory concentrates on the ratios analysis, and
the pecking order theory focuses on the costs analysis,

then a correlation coefficient study between these two
variables (debt-ratios and costs) would explain the
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behaviors and orientations of an eventual model for the
sake of an optimal capital structure. The

tradeoff-pecking-order new theory will present a potential
starting point for future researches and investigations

looking for the scientific answers concerning the
existence of an optimal capital structure that the
existing theories do not solve.
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